

# Transcript of an interview with Trevor Manuel, Johannesburg, 10 September 2014

## Contents

Formation of Cabinet .....	1
Parliament.....	5
Cabinet caucus .....	5
Guiding processes.....	6
Managing change of finance minister .....	7
Location of Parliament .....	8
Another finance minister .....	9
GEAR .....	10

## Formation of Cabinet

TT Were you aware of the process Madiba went through as he made up his mind about who in the ANC would be in the Cabinet?

TM To get there, can I step back? In many respects I think his selections were influenced by his personal preferences which were in turn also a consequence of judgments that he exercised at close quarters.

That group of people, the 'inziles' if you wish, who went along on his first trip, were largely from the Reception Committee: Cyril, Jay, Valli, John Gomomo and I, and maybe a sixth person whose name escapes me now. That put us in very close proximity to him.

That was March 1990. I then went back to Cape Town, so I was not immediately at the first HQ which was where Luthuli House is now. But there were interactions because I was standing in for Reg September in the internal leadership corps. When Madiba came to Cape Town, for instance, and had to see De Klerk at one point, he contacted me to drive him: 'Get a car and fetch me.' So I was a kind of driver and bodyguard, everything.

Then the following year, in July 1991, the first elective conference was held and soon after that the election of the NWC.

Perhaps then already he was starting to show a hand in the way in which responsibilities were assigned. There must have been a judgment call in his mind and in consultation with others, because at that stage people like Uncle Walter and JS and Thabo would all have been very close to him and influencing him. By then Cyril was the secretary-general and JZ his deputy: that was one line. Then there was Thabo heading up the Department of International Affairs, I think, and JS sitting in the Party.

We were called and assigned responsibilities. I think that was quite a critical period in trying to cast the die for what was to follow. There were some issues and I think those issues would have carried through into the next phase. When I

was assigned Economics, I got a call from Cyril who said, 'Look I've had a discussion with Comrade President. He is abroad now but he's asked me to call and tell you people what departments you have responsibilities for in the NWC.' You would recall that NWC members were NEC members and NWC members had to live close to the office and be full-time in the ANC heading up departments.

Cyril said, 'Madiba wants you to head DEP [Department of Economic Planning].' I replied, 'I don't think that's a good appointment. I know no economics.' He said, 'So what do you know?' I said, 'You know I've been assigned in the ANC in the Western Cape to work on health issues.'

'There are many doctors in the ANC,' Cyril said, 'Trevor, just be clear, this is not a negotiation between you and I. I am conveying a message.'

When I came to Shell House it had been announced through the system that I was now head of the DEP. Nobody had sat down to tell Max Sisulu, 'You have headed DEP all this time, there's a new head because the head must be a member of the NWC.' I was just cast into that situation, dependent on establishing a series of other relationships including with Tito, Maria and Ketso. And DEP was big enough – even though Zola had had Land in the last years in exile, it was now part of the DEP and so was science and technology. So it was actually quite a big department.

What we had to do included accompanying Madiba on foreign missions (apart from the general political occasions that he attended in the US.) Part of what he was doing was relationship building, but there was also a very strong posture. He would take delegations along. For instance, a motley crew of us went along to Taiwan including Pallo, Nkobi of course, Joe Modise. That was positioning to try and secure training and money, very clearly, and all those other sorts of things Madiba did. But it was also exposing us and listening to what we were doing.

That was in 1993. In September of the same year we went in a small delegation to the UN General Assembly, addressed an investors conference in New York and then flew to Washington DC where he addressed two investors conferences. I am mentioning this mission because he would say, 'We've got these young people like Trevor Manuel here. I'd like him to speak to you, I'd like him to answer the questions after I've spoken.' He would do that kind of thing. I think that to some extent he was bleeding somebody like myself in that environment, positioning me for something.

He did that with others too, if you look at the NWC. Valli for instance was going to be involved in the negotiations: that was a role cast for him in the NWC which would then have laid the basis for him being deputy minister to Roelf Meyer at first. Sydney was heading up the peace process which I think cast the die for him to become minister of police. Joe Modise, coming through MK, would have been a natural fit as part of Military HQ in that period. I think that by and large those interactions in Madiba's mind were creating early on in the process, for want of a better word, a kind of shadow cabinet of people who were assigned

certain responsibilities I think. That process had a profound impact on the way in which he saw certain things.

In the period around the elections some of us, while we were waiting for results, had to talk about the shape of the Government of National Unity. It wasn't a completely blank slate but I think Madiba had allowed his mind to be made up by these interactions and his set of observations and probably his likes and dislikes. He also demonstrated, I think, a strong strategic sense about certain choices. In that period, I think that may be even have been before De Klerk conceded, there was a discussion in which he said, 'There are certain positions we will not fight for now because the country may not be ready for it.' One of those positions was clearly finance. I had a sense that he may have engaged Derek Keys about continuity either directly or through De Klerk, because he understood that Derek wasn't a narrowly party person.

As government was shaping, we were already in May. On Friday 6 May an NWC meeting had been convened. One had a sense that there was no shape or form that's firm yet. In that NWC he said that he had consulted the officials. He then announced formally, 'Look there are some positions we can't fight for. There are some positions where we have to reward those who helped us get to this point. There are some positions that Mr. De Klerk and I have discussed and we can confirm these now.'

That was when he announced that Thabo would be deputy president and Alfred Nzo would be foreign affairs. The fallout with Cyril had already happened. Madiba had this view that Cyril should be deputy president so that you don't construct a Xhosa dynasty or perceptions of that. But he also was clear that Walter and some others felt that the fallout with the exile comrades would be too big if he went that route.

Sydney would get police; I would get trade and industry. Then there were two other appointments from the people who worked with us in DEP, and I had to go and tell them: one was Tito who would become minister of labour and the other was Derek Hanekom would become minister of land affairs. Agriculture was conceded, finance was conceded, and constitutional development was conceded. But announced on the day as well was Ahmed Kathrada as prisons.

I remember raising an issue, I don't know if it was formally in the NWC or whether it was with Madiba, whether it would be better to give land to Pallo because he had written about land. He had also written about the national question and Derek coming at this issue as an Afrikaner may have not worked. But Madiba said, 'This is not a negotiation.' He was pretty clear about the fact that his mind was made up. I wasn't privy to how that was done.

I have a very strong sense that somebody like Thabo must have been very closely involved because when we came out of the meeting I went to the twenty-first floor to tell the department, waiting with bated breath, about Tito and Derek. Thabo called me down to his office and said, 'Chief, now that you are going to become the minister of trade and industry there is a very special meeting taking place between the OECD ministers of commerce and some of

the Eastern Bloc countries and that meeting is happening in Warsaw today and tomorrow, so get onto a plane tonight and go and announce yourself at that meeting at Warsaw tomorrow.'

I said, 'I'm not even a Member of Parliament.' He replied, 'No you go.' I said, 'I need to be back on Sunday afternoon for this Parliamentary stuff'. He just said, 'You will be back.' When I asked how I would be back he told me, 'I'm going to give you someone to go with you, Peter Matlare.' When I got there the big host of myself who introduced me to everybody was Ron Brown, the United States commerce secretary. Ron announced me and indicated that I would be part of this bigger team and so on. I flew back with Matlare on a small plane. I don't know how many stops we had to make to Joburg and through to Cape Town, and we got there in the afternoon.

I didn't know what all of this was going to entail but I had a sense that Madiba's influence would have been big, understanding that I didn't have any academic training for that position but hoping that I would be able to rise to the occasion. Thabo clearly supported the entire initiative. I suppose I was too junior to be part of the consultation.

We became members of Parliament on 9 May. We arrived at Parliament on the Sunday afternoon and were sworn in on the Monday. Madiba addressed that meeting on the Grand Parade after we were sworn in as members and he was inaugurated the next day.

When we went to the inauguration we were a bit miffed because we didn't quite appreciate the fact that there was constitutional continuity and that the people who were ministers under the old order were still ministers at the time Madiba was inaugurated and that we were just there amongst the general masses.

Without warning somebody approached us and said, 'You must remain.' I can't remember who it was, it may have been somebody from the secretary-general's office. After the inauguration, the lunch and so on, we were taken to Burgers Park Hotel. There were a number of us who didn't live in Johannesburg or Pretoria and who hadn't been advised to bring a toothbrush or anything like that. The following morning we were fetched from the hotel and taken to the Union Buildings.

It would have been about 10 o'clock that we arrived. There was a consultation inside the president's office and it was clear that De Klerk and Thabo were in there. Those of us who had assignments didn't anticipate that that would change. There were also things we had to do while some people were waiting – for example I had to go and see Fidel Castro and then come back.

What also happened during the day was that there were people who went there who didn't have assignments. Let me single out two.

Jay Naidoo didn't have an assignment. *[NOTE: Jay Naidoo was in a reported ANC list of ministers the Friday before the inauguration, but as a 'minister without portfolio']* There was a lobby including some people from COSATU and so on

who wanted an RDP minister. By the previous Friday Madiba was resolute there wasn't going to be one. But there must have been some very intense lobbying because it would have been around lunchtime when Jay was called in and came out, gave a thumbs-up and said, 'Yes!' And they had the RDP as ministry.

Kader's assignment happened after that. He went in and came out. Louise was standing there with Lynne and I and Louise asked, 'What?' He had been hoping it would be constitutional development. I thought the signals from Madiba that that position would go to Roelf were clear on the previous Friday but Kader wasn't a member of the NWC. He said, 'It's Water Affairs, I'm quite disappointed.' But Louise responded, 'No Kader, you can make this a human rights issue, it's a great opportunity,' and then he was happy.

Later that day we were convened in that boardroom next to the president's office. Almost the entire Cabinet could fit around that table and a photograph was taken.

Those of us who had portfolios were encouraged to go and meet our departments.

## **Parliament**

Amongst the things that had to happen was that Parliament had to be bedded down and responsibilities assigned. Something that happened to me was that I was assigned leader of government business in the first term. It was one of those disastrous appointments. It was Madiba who told me, 'You are going to be leader of government business.' I was minister of trade and industry and I had to travel extensively, with him and without him, and also try and open South Africa to international investment and so on. I had no idea of how Parliament worked. It would have been far better to take one of the older chaps who was more rooted, who would understand the Parliamentary rules process better. I think of someone like Kader with his water affairs portfolio.

I could never quite fathom why I was given that assignment, I had no particular skill set to equip me. As Tony Leon says in his book, the Democratic Party went to see to Madiba to say to him that I was actually a disaster as leader of government business. It's not a judgment I can disagree with because I was a disaster. It was completely unsighted of the responsibility of the minister of trade and industry who has an assignment that is pretty mobile. It clearly didn't work.

## **Cabinet caucus**

During that tenure Madiba's role was fundamentally important and hands-on.

One thing he did, in appreciation of the fact that it was a Government of National Unity, when Parliament was in session was to convene us at Genadendal for supper in the dining room on the night before the Cabinet meeting so that we could caucus positions that we wanted to take and be mutually supportive. It afforded comrades to have a discussion that was quite free.

It was at a meeting like that that we were waiting to start. He and Joe Modise weren't in the room. They came back and Madiba with that stern face said, 'Joe!' Joe Modise began crying: 'It's not a nice day for me to say this, it is my birthday but the President has spoken to me about this contract to buy the corvettes from Spain and he said that we will cancel this contract. I don't know how I'm going to tell my troops, especially the navy, that we are cancelling the contract. But the president assures me that we would look at this thing.' It was at meetings like that that this kind of interaction happened.

### **Guiding processes**

There were other meetings at which Madiba would interact and guide processes.

I and Tito, my deputy in DEP and later minister of labour, were personal friends. But early in the process we had very intense arguments. He would go away and spend may be a week at a stretch, holed up in the Carlton with labour leaders and lawyers like Halton Cheadle and Paul Benjamin and some business leaders to put together the first legislation like NEDLAC, the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.

One Sunday we were at Mahlambandlovu, I don't know what it was we were doing there. Madiba took me out of the room and walked me on the back terrace and said, 'You know, Tito came to see me. There is this issue in this law about Sunday work and he says that you don't agree with him. Explain to me.'

So I explained, 'My understanding is that we are now a secular state; the Sunday Observance Act has been repealed. If workers work, let's say a five-day week and if you're an ambulance driver, you can't say "No accidents or people becoming ill over weekends because we work a five-day week". Why should Sunday be double play always?'

He responded, 'No, I agree with you but you see, Tito has told me he will resign if he doesn't get this and, you know, he's a young chap, younger even than you, sometimes a bit hotheaded. I wouldn't like to lose him.'

I started protesting, 'But, but, but, Comrade President ...' He just said, 'Relax, it's not the end of the world.'

He would engage like that. I served under four presidents and he was the only president who would engage with you like that.

So the question about hands-off or not, is answered in a variety of interactions like that. There were a number of ministers he would talk to. He would convene us to talk like that, and I recall that incident on a Sunday.

There was another thing that he did on the same day. 'You, see that beautiful piece of land down below,' he said, 'that's where we must build Parliament.' Madiba would lobby positions like that as well, try and build consensus, drive agendas.

Also pertinent in this regard, maybe towards the end of June 1994, I got a call, it must have been Mary Mxadana or someone in his office, 'The president wants

to talk to you.' 'Look,' he says, 'Derek Keys is supposed to address a conference in New York; go to New York and speak at the same conference with him.' Because Derek said he would go on Concorde, I did the same. I went on Saturday evening, flew the Concorde over on Sunday morning, but the Concorde broke down and the story got out that I was on the Concorde and as a new member of Parliament and leader of government business I was slayed.

### **Managing change of finance minister**

Early on, in July 1994, President Mitterrand made one of the first visits by a foreign head of state. There was a banquet for Mitterrand at the Mount Nelson on a Monday.

On the Saturday before at about four in the morning I got a call, 'Hello Trevor, I hope I didn't wake you. Can you come to see me? Just take the first flight and come.' Our offices were not yet properly established; I had a cell phone from the April election campaign but PAs didn't have cell phones. How at four o'clock in the morning do you try and get on an early morning flight! But I did it, called drivers, came to Pretoria and came to Mahlabandlopfu.

Thabo and Tito, were there, maybe Alec. Madiba said, 'Chaps, you know Derek came to see me and told me that there are certain reasons why he can't stay on Cabinet. It's not political. I've given him the benefit of the doubt but I must find a new finance minister. Look, I've been talking to people and I don't think the country and the world and white people in particular are ready for an ANC finance minister. I hope that you agree with me. I thought I must tell you this and ask if you have any suggestions for a finance minister.'

We looked at each other and he said, 'You know, I've been thinking about this fellow Chris Liebenberg, he is retired from that bank, he's been my banker and he's been the ANC's banker. He's a very good man. White business will really support him. Do you have any difficulty with him?' None of us had difficulties. He said, 'Thank you very much. Let's have some tea. You chaps can leave.'

That was Saturday. On Monday, Mitterrand was here and there was the banquet. Madiba called Kader and asked him to sit next to Mitterrand and talk to him, and he told Mitterrand there was a meeting he couldn't escape from, which he had to go to right then. And he slipped out.

I picked this up from Chris Liebenberg subsequently. He had been abroad and he gets this call Monday afternoon: 'Oh, Chris how are you?' 'Mr President I am very well.' Madiba says, 'Chris I need to talk to you' and Chris says, 'No, I'm not at the Bank.'

Madiba tells him, 'No, I need to talk to you, can you come and see me?' So Chris asks, 'Mr President where are you, in Houghton?', 'No, in Cape Town, but I need to see you tonight.'

Chris, had to fly to Cape Town and get to Genadendal. When they meet Madiba asks, 'Chris, what are you doing now?' He tells him, 'I'm retired.' 'How old are you?' He says, 'I am sixty.' Madiba says, 'Yes, you are too young to

retire, Chris. I've got an assignment for you. I want you to be my finance minister, Derek is leaving and I want you to take over.'

Chris says he's completely shocked, nothing can prepare him for this. He says, 'Having just retired, I will have to consult with my wife about this.' So that's how Chris becomes finance minister.

### **Location of Parliament**

Another thing that happened about this time, around April or May of 1995, concerned the location of Parliament.

There was a lobby to keep Parliament in Cape Town, the Cape Town Alliance, and they appointed Kallie Hanekom to head it. Kallie arranged for a number of us to be interviewed, to say how nice it is for Parliament to be in Cape Town. The *Saturday Argus* came out with a two-page spread of this strong group of ministers who wanted Parliament to remain Cape Town.

My office got a call from Virginia Engel in Madiba's office saying, 'The president wants to see the minister.'

I arrive there. Zola Skweyiya is sitting there. 'What are you doing?' I ask him. 'I don't know, I was called here, I don't know why.'

'Is there anyone else in there?' I ask. 'Yes, Dullah.' 'Okay, it is probably this Cape Town Parliament thing,' I say and he says, 'I don't know, I don't know but the old man's not happy.'

Then a crestfallen Dullah emerges from Madiba's office, doesn't talk and doesn't look at us, just walks straight past. Zola is going in, Kader is arriving now and just as I was going in Pallo arrived as well.

Madiba basically said to me, 'So Trevor, you belong to a faction in Cabinet. Your faction is lobbying through the press to have Parliament in Cape Town. You know our views on the matter. You know that I think that the best option that we have to move Parliament to Pretoria is during the one term that I am president. You know that. You know that I've asked Mac and Jeff to undertake the research. You know all of that, yet you ignore that and become part of this faction to lobby against decisions that are in the national interest of this country.'

I tried to protest: I wasn't part of a faction, we had never met on this issue. He said, 'I'm not interested in your views, you are part of a faction. I want you to hear me: you are part of a faction along with all of you chaps who live here in Cape Town.' He continued, 'You know you're a very good minister and you will become better but if you don't want to be part of the collective then you must leave. How do you want to conduct yourself?'

I think that for me it was a signal experience because heads of state don't talk to people; we don't have that experience in this country. This was Madiba. He had a viewpoint. You could disagree with his viewpoint but he was the head of state and if you didn't want to be part of the team you had to decide how you played it. For me that was one of the big take-outs of that engagement. It

removes the idea of this uninvolved saint who had no views of his own. He was okay with confronting people with issues, even when they weren't comfortable. He was going to hold the line. For me, regarding his tenure, it's fundamentally important that issues like that be recognised.

- TT He wrote notes, angry notes, about that incident. There were other moments when he adopted a similar stance. During the negotiations, for example, when the idea of a Government of National Unity had been agreed by the NEC and some people were still arguing against it, he made a similar intervention.
- TM You can play back some other situations, which is why I am saying that perhaps his period as the president of the ANC is not properly understood, because it hasn't been written about as extensively as other periods. When Peter Mokaba was singing *dubula amabhunu*, for instance, and the Youth League were defiant, Madiba called them in. He sat there with Walter and Joe and Thomas Nkobi and said, 'You are going to issue a statement.' They issued a mealy-mouthed statement and he called them back and said, 'This is an ANC view, it is not your view.' He was demanding that they go and issue a fresh statement but Uncle Walter advised him, 'No Madiba, it's okay, the young are angry but I think they've understood the lesson.'

He was very engaged in taking positions and seeing them through. He would never stand back from them.

### **Another change of finance minister**

In about August 1995 he called again. While I was waiting to see him Thabo arrived from upstairs and we were taken into his office together.

We sat down and he said, 'Now you remember that we had to call Chris out of retirement but he told me in those discussions that by the time of the second budget he wants to leave. The second budget is in March next year and I must be loyal to my commitment to Chris, so I have thought about this issue.' Then he says, 'Trevor, I would like you to become minister of finance. Are you prepared to do it?' I told him, 'I would be honoured.' He asked Thabo, 'Do you have a difficulty with this position?' Thabo replied, 'No, no, no, I think he's doing well in trade and industry.'

Madiba added, 'Now, you going to be the first black minister of finance and people are going to find fault with you but Chris won't leave until March. I want you to be prepared. There must be no gap between what he's doing and what you are doing and in addition to your job as minister of trade and industry you will have to learn about what the finance ministry does and you have the responsibility to ensure that not a word of this gets out. I think that you are skilled enough to shadow Chris Liebenberg without anybody knowing what's going on.'

Part of what was done was to set up a committee of ministers on the budget, it's still there as MinComBud in whatever form. If we were all there and talking about the budget quietly then my involvement would not be remarkable.

Madiba would call me from time to time and ask, 'How is it going? Are you following Chris? Are you ready, are you taking an interest in this matter?' In March '96 he called me more regularly. And then he said, 'Okay, it's all systems go, I'll announce this at the end of Chris's next budget which is the end of March, but there will be a few changes I need to tell you. I think Alec has learnt very well in finance and I want to move him to trade and industry in your position, but don't talk to him yet. You will need a deputy and Gill is doing very well in the portfolio committee and I want to move her there, and don't talk to her either.' Then he called me about the 19<sup>th</sup> or 20<sup>th</sup> of March and said, 'You can talk to Gill but not Alec.'

He had kind of made up his mind about how things work and don't work. I called Gill and she and I had supper together on 21 March - it wasn't a public holiday yet. By then she had been told and she was completely over the moon and I knew reasonably what the realm of the finance team in the finance ministry entailed. We sat in the Anatoli restaurant in Cape Town and shared the division of labour between us in an interim way to be confirmed later in writing so that we could erect the fences that would make us good neighbours.

Soon after my appointment, it's so important, I had my first press conference as minister of finance and the late Greta Steyn asked me, 'Now that you are minister of finance you better answer the question the market wants to know. When are you going to lift exchange controls?'

'But, how can the market want to know,' I responded, 'the market has no form, the market couldn't send you to ask me a question. The market is amorphous.'

I'm not so clever to know such big words but in that period Thabo had addressed the 120<sup>th</sup> anniversary dinner of the *Cape Times* newspaper and talked about, how can you dance to the music of the market, this faceless, non-corporeal, amorphous band. I used one of those adjectives, 'amorphous'.

The context was completely lost because Greta was angry that I engaged her, but it was also a time when you are there and young.

And there were these other messages coming through – Madiba told me that some business people were very unhappy about him appointing somebody 'who knows no finance' as the minister of finance but that he had said to them, 'We will prove you wrong.' And in one of my last discussions with Madiba in the months before he died, when he still could articulate these things, he said, 'You know, Trevor, there are two things that make me very happy. The one is that we were able to prove them wrong. The other thing is, by appointing you, a young black man, we were able to open the door for other blacks.'

Madiba developed his favourites and how he dealt with it was in his own Madiba style.

## **GEAR**

That was '96. As part of the handover, Alec took me to meet a group of economists who were working on the fact that the country was in deep trouble because we had this huge balance of payments constraint. I went off to the

Development Bank where the people working on this problem and trying to solve it were: Andre Roux, Maria Ramos; Stephen Gelb; Iraj Abedian who was then still at UCT, and a Brazilian chap Luis Perreira De Silva who was at the World Bank at the time. We didn't have a solid team in the treasury yet. They then talked me through the deep trouble we were in and I went to meet them again with Gill. And so we ran this kind of secret process.

We checked the position at the beginning of April. There was already a fallout because Pallo was dropped from the Cabinet and Jay was given communications. The RDP office was closed and some of its functions transferred to the finance portfolio leaving a large group of people somewhat displaced – a large group who had been brought in with a short line of communication into COSATU. So there was a great deal of unhappiness about that and about our assignment.

With the benefit of hindsight, I didn't know a fraction of the economics that people were talking but you needed to build trust, you needed to build a strong position and as it started gelling I think we could actually see what it was that we needed to do. You could see where the low road was taking us and you could try and deal with this thing in a particular way. The big problem that you had was that there was very little by way of inflow and the deficit was approaching six per cent - it was high from about 1992 - the revenue streams were minuscule and we were sitting on a powder keg.

Then there was the politics and the economics of it. We had political discussions with Madiba and Thabo about the process, explaining where it was. They gave us encouragement to work through it and keep them in the loop because it was going to be very sensitive. I remember briefing them and the suggestion being made that we should bring in the Alliance leaders. That old relationship had taken a bit of strain. JS had passed away by then. We were nervous, Gill and I: we were quite uninformed of all of the issues, we were not economists and we had to listen to what people were telling us. We kind of agreed that if we had the work in place we would announce it in Parliament with the finance minister's budget vote in the middle of June.

We agreed to have a consultation with the Alliance partners and perhaps people like Cyril and them from the ANC as well. On a Sunday morning, at Madiba's house in Houghton, we had a meeting in a rondawel structure at the back. We spoke to these comrades and part of what was in the room was the fact that the RDP office had closed down and part of what was in the room was the fact that Gill and I couldn't answer all of the questions. But offsetting that you had Madiba and Thabo trying to provide some political equilibrium to this discussion.

What we also were battling with was how this whole thing was going to work. I don't know in that week if I managed more than four hours sleep on any day. We all just worked flat, flat, flat out. It was on about the Wednesday evening that we looked at what we were trying to establish with the program: we wanted growth; we wanted labour absorbing growth; and we wanted a focus on redistribution. Those were the elements which, when we put them together,

made Growth Employment and Redistribution. It was Gill eventually who came up with the name and the acronym and when we had that it started feeling a bit better.

The announcement was made a few days after the consultation with the Alliance leadership. After the debate in Parliament, in which Phillip Dexter, treasurer of the Party, and Blade spoke, Vavi issued a statement as the acting general secretary of COSATU saying, 'We didn't get everything we wanted, we are a bit worried about how quickly we're cutting the deficit.' If you read the statements you can only arrive at the conclusion that there must have been some discussion. Then this thing spun out of control later.

Both then, and in the NEC, I thought Madiba handled this matter because he allowed it to be discussed, the economics to be discussed again. I still think that at the fiftieth national conference at Mafeking in 1997, when Madiba stepped down and Thabo took over, the resolution on economic transformation tried to bring the issues together within the fold of the ANC.